Product Differentiation Through Space and Time: Some Antitrust Policy Issues by Baker, Jonathan
American University Washington College of Law 
Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of 
Law 
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic 
Journals Scholarship & Research 
1997 
Product Differentiation Through Space and Time: Some Antitrust 
Policy Issues 
Jonathan Baker 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/facsch_lawrev 
 Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and 
the Intellectual Property Law Commons 
The Antitrust Bulletin/Spring 1997
Product differentiation through
space and time: some antitrust
policy issues
BY JONATHAN B. BAKER*
After a century of interpreting the Sherman Act, antitrust has
learned how to do some things quite well. We understand what
is wrong with naked horizontal price fixing and market division,
and we have developed strong tools to deal with those problems.
We can generally prevent mergers to monopoly and we are pretty
good at preventing other mergers that increase market power.
At least, we can do so in the kinds of industries that antitrust grew
up with, in which firms make and sell substantially similar prod-
ucts and compete in terms of current production and prices, rather
than innovation.
But antitrust has been less successful in other areas. This arti-
cle explores the problems antitrust confronts when products are
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differentiated. It focuses on two types of differentiation in particu-
lar. The first appears most commonly in consumer products indus-
tries, in which a large number of brands are available and the
products vary in physical attributes and images. Products like soft
drinks and automobiles provide examples. Here the differentiation
is "spatial," to use the economist's metaphor of products located
at various positions in an abstract characteristics space. The sec-
ond type of differentiation emphasizes that firms in these indus-
tries often introduce new products over time. There was a time,
after all, when Coke and Pepsi did not sell sugar-free or caffeine-
free colas, and when General Motors and Ford did not sell sub-
compact cars. Product innovation can be thought of as creating
goods differentiated over time.
In differentiated product settings, this article explains,
antitrust has had trouble isolating anticompetitive harm and devis-
ing a procompetitive remedy within the conventional rule-of-rea-
son, market-definition paradigm. The problems appear in legal
doctrine, but their roots, and their possible resolutions, rest in
economic analysis. Accordingly, this article begins, in section I,
with the economics of spatial product differentiation. Section II
considers merger analysis in differentiated product industries, and
section III examines the problems antitrust faces in identify-
ing anticompetitive conduct arising from the development and
marketing of new products.
I. Economics of product differentiation
Product differentiation across space is of particular interest in
merger analysis. The 1992 Merger Guidelines contain a section
devoted to analyzing the unilateral competitive effects of mergers
when products are differentiated.' Although spatial product differ-
entiation appears in multiple forms, this article will focus primar-
ily on the common situation in which producers respond to
different consumer tastes by offering different sets of product
U.S. Dept. of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, 1992 Hori-
zontal Merger Guidelines, § 2.21, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) T 13,104.
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attributes or projecting different product images. 2 For example,
the Federal Trade Commission has over the years examined merg-
ers in the soft drink industry.3 Soft drinks are characterized by
variety in flavor, packaging, and image that together produce dis-
tinct brand identities.
Differentiation itself is not unambiguously good or bad. Buy-
ers typically benefit from the availability of a wide variety of
product offerings to serve their differing preferences. Yet differen-
tiation can also facilitate the exercise of market power. The pro-
ducer of a differentiated product often enjoys a localized
monopoly and may, in consequence, be able to charge a higher
price than it otherwise could.
The investments firms make in differentiation, moreover, can
change a market's structure in ways that might, to first appear-
ances, lead to the suspicion that the market is not competitive.
In particular, when the firms irn an industry make large invest-
ments in brand reputations and their new products pipeline, the
number of firms is often low and prices are often well above seller
variable costs. 4 Also, firms may find it possible, and profitable, to
2 Differentiation can be thought of as spatial in at least two other
settings. First, buyers may care about seller reputation, so that the plain
fact of a seller's identity could differentiate its products from those of
other sellers. This type of differentiation can appear in the form of buyers
requiring sellers to become "qualified" to sell to them. Second, shopping
or transportation cost may matter, so that differentiation appears on the
basis of seller or producer location.
3 See, e.g., FTC v. Coca-Cola Co., 641 F. Supp. 1128 (D.D.C.
1986) (preliminary injunction), vacated mem., 829 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
4 JOHN SUrON, SUNK COSTS AND MARKET STRUCTURE: PRICE COMPETI-
TION, ADVERTISING AND THE EVOLUTION OF CONCENTRATION (1991); see Timo-
thy F. Bresnahan, Sutton's Sunk Costs and Market Structure: Price
Competition, Advertising, and the Evolution of Concentration, 23 RAND
J. EcON. 137 (1992). Sutton emphasizes that firms have an incentive
to make fixed investments in product differentiation or R&D to reduce
localized competition, thereby raising price-cost margins. Moreover,
when rivals must match these investments in order to keep their products
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discriminate in price or to sell different products to different seg-
ments of the market.5
Yet it is too quick to conclude that such an industry necessar-
ily presents an antitrust problem. These features of industry struc-
ture-high concentration, high price-cost margins, and price
discrimination-are also consistent with an industry setting we
should reasonably call competitive because it is characterized by
free entry.6 Under such circumstances, the high price-cost margins
merely cover the high fixed costs of achieving differentiation, 7
and the entry constraint limits the ability of firms to use price dis-
crimination to exploit identifiable groups of customers with
attractive to buyers, industry prices may rise through operation of the
"integer effect"-the increment to prices that arises on average even with
free entry when a market that previously could have held, for example,
51/2 firms (of at least minimum viable scale, given the fixed costs of entry)
turns into one that fits only, say, 31/2 firms. Cf. N. Gregory Mankiw &
Michael D. Whinston, Free Entry ad Social Inefficiency, 17 RAND J.
ECON. 48 (1986) (product variety combined with the integer effect will
lead to less than the socially optimal number of firms, unless these forces
are compensated for by sufficient incumbent accommodation of entry);
but cf STEVEN BERRY & JOEL WALDFOGEL, FREE ENTRY AND SOCIAL INEFFi-
ciENcY IN RADIO BROADCASTING (Nat'l Bureau Econ. Res. Working Paper
5528, 1996) (example in which inefficiently many firms enter).
5 Economic price discrimination, that is different price-cost margins
on sales of the same goods to different buyers, is not necessarily the same
as discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act.
6 The technical literature generally employs the term "free entry" to
mean that the economic profits of incumbent firms are driven to zero (or
as close as practicable given the integer constraint). Typically, this out-
come will require significant accommodation of entry by incumbents.
The literature on contestable markets emphasizes that high concentration
is not necessarily inconsistent with competitive outcomes in free-entry
settings. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE
THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1982).
7 An incumbent's average prices will not exceed a new entrant's
average variable cost by enough to induce entry. Note that what have
been fixed costs for incumbents are typically variable costs for the
prospective entrant. Once the new firm enters, it expects to earn a profit
contribution (revenues less short-run postentry variable costs) that covers
its fixed costs.
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inelastic demand. 8 On the other hand, if incumbent firms are able
to commit to aggressive postentry competition, rather than accom-
modating entry, they can achieve prices above what competition
would permit.9 Investments in product differentiation could be one
way of doing so. 10
This analysis suggests that ease of entry can be expected to
play a critical role in preserving competition in differentiated-
8 See Severin Borenstein, Price Discrimination in Free-Entry Mar-
kets, 16 RAND J. ECON. 380 (1985); T. Holmes, The Effects of Third-
Degree Price Discrimination in Oligopoly, 79 Am. ECON. REv. 9 (1989);
DANIEL F. SPULBER, REGULATION AND MARKETS 544-48 (1989). With free
entry, an entrant expecting to mimic the price discrimination of incum-
bents would most likely generate the greatest contribution margins (price
less marginal cost, relative to price) from those identifiable groups of
buyers with the most inelastic demand. The aggregate contribution (price
less variable cost, summed over all groups of buyers) would be capped,
however, by virtue of the constraint that average revenue not exceed
entrant's average variable cost by enough to induce entry. (One striking
implication: if demand by any one group of buyers becomes more elastic,
that group will see prices fall while other buyers may pay higher prices.
For example, suppose that several small employers offering employee
health benefits begin to purchase coverage as a group, thereby threaten-
ing to divert a large number of patients in response to a small price rise
and thus making the demand doctors face from these employers more
elastic. The employers will likely be able to negotiate a lower price. If
the local health care markets are characterized by free entry, one result
may be slightly higher prices for other groups of patients.)
9 The greater the sunk investments required for entry, and the
greater the incumbents' commitment to a rapid and aggressive response,
the more entry is deterred by the threat of postentry competition. See
generally Richard J. Gilbert, Mobility Barriers and the Value of Incum-
bency, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 475 (R. Schmalensee
& R. Willig eds., 1989); Steven C. Salop, Strategic Entry Deterrence,
69 AM. EcON. REv. 335 (Papers and Proceedings 1979).
10 That is, firms may achieve higher prices through strategic invest-
ments in product differentiation if those investments effectively commit
incumbent firms to respond more rapidly or aggressively to entry (thus
changing the nature of the postentry oligopoly interaction). Gilbert, supra
note 9, at 503-06; Richard Schmalensee, Entry Deterrence in the Ready-
to-Eat Breakfast Cereal Industry, 9 BELL J. ECON. 305 (1978).
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product markets. In contrast, interfirm rivalry may be a less sig-
nificant competitive force than in homogeneous product indus-
tries, because competition is localized in differentiated-product
settings." This point will return in the discussion of antitrust
issues that arise from the introduction of new products.
II. Mergers where spatial differentiation is extreme
Extreme product differentiation-the situation that arises
when firms sell a wide range of styles, flavors, colors and similar
characteristics, so there are no "gaps" in the chain of substitutes-
can befuddle the antitrust analysis of mergers. 12 The law is often
preoccupied with defining a single "market" so that proxies for
market power, usually market share, can be brought to bear on the
ultimate questions. The output of this method, the impossibly ger-
rymandered left-handed one-eyed man with a limp product mar-
ket, often appears in after-dinner speeches as comic relief. And
the resulting market shares often mislead about the potential for
the merger to harm competition in the localized regions in which
differentiated product sellers may be able to raise price. Where
products are highly differentiated, the competition policy concern
is more likely to be about single-firm effects than about interfirm
coordination. The gains from coordinating an increase in the
prices of distant substitutes are likely to be low, compared to the
gains from reducing competition among close substitutes. Thus
the concern is typically less about what might happen in the outer
reaches of a "market," than about what might happen among the
merging firms' own products.
" Incumbent firms may find that price cutting does not allow them
to increase sales enough to compensate for the lost profit margin on their
current output. (If so, a price above incumbent marginal cost may be sus-
tainable.) Price cutting is typically a less profitable strategy the more
marginal costs rise with output, the more products are differentiated, and
the more rapidly rivals can respond by matching the price cut.
12 Markets with firms differentiated by location can also be highly
differentiated, raising similar difficulties for merger analysis. Examples
may include supermarkets, hospitals or drug stores.
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The brewing industry during the 1970s provides an example
illustrating the problems of relying on market definition and mar-
ket shares to identify market power among sellers of differentiated
products. 13 Pabst and Coors had similar shares of the national beer
"market," and each had high shares in a distinct region of the
country. Although market shares did not strongly distinguish the
firms, they played very different competitive roles: Coors was
largely free from localized competition while Pabst was not.
Moreover, the market share leader, Anheuser-Busch (the seller of
Budweiser), exercised little market power after 1975. Combina-
tions among these brewers could have made a Budweiser price
increase profitable, because a combination with either brand
would have removed a constraint on Anheuser-Busch's ability to
raise price. But such mergers would not have led to an increase in
the price of Pabst's or Coors's flagship brands, because their posi-
tions were different: the Coors brand was isolated, with no other
brand constraining it, while the Pabst brand was constrained by
many others. In short, market shares did not reveal the competi-
tive role played by these firms or their ability to exercise market
power.
When it comes to identifying market power in differentiated-
product industries, as this example suggests, it may not be helpful
to commence the antitrust analysis by asking, What is the relevant
market? and then computing market shares. Rather, in examining
the competitive effects of a transaction such as a merger, the first
question should be, If one product's price rises, and its sales
decline, where do the lost buyers go? 14 This question is critical
13 This example is based on Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy F. Bresna-
han, The Gains for Merger or Collusion in Product-Differentiated Indus-
tries, 33 J. IND. ECON. 427 (1985) and Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy F.
Bresnahan, Estimating the Residual Demand Curve Facing a Single
Firm, 6 INT'L J. IND. ORG. 283 (1988). See also Jonathan Baker & Timo-
thy F. Bresnahan, Empirical Methods of Identifying and Measuring Mar-
ket Power, 61 ANTrrRuST L.J. 3 (1992).
14 Carl Shapiro asks a similar question in seeking to estimate what
he calls the "diversion ratio," that is, the fraction of the sales lost by the
product whose price is increased that would be captured by the other
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because it helps identify situations in which localized competition
among the products of the merging firms keeps prices low-and
thus helps identify the products for which the firms will have a
strong incentive to raise price following the acquisition. That is, if
a firm selling product A acquires product B, its incentive to raise
the price of A will be greater the larger the number of buyers of A
who would react to a price increase by shifting to B. 15 The con-
cern in these combinations of differentiated products is what hap-
pens to prices if firms internalize what was previously important
localized competition.
Consumer substitution patterns in response to a price increase
are not the only factors important to the analysis of unilateral
competitive effects. The merged firm's incentive to raise the price
of product A is also greater, for example, the higher the price-cost
margin on product B relative to product A, and the less rival firms
selling other potential substitutes respond by competing more
aggressively on price or modifying product characteristics to
become even closer substitutes. Economists have developed a
number of good techniques for integrating these factors, 16 all of
which have been or would be used by government enforcers in
appropriate cases. 17 With the development of these empirical
tools, the competition of market shares is often no longer the best
party's product. Carl Shapiro, Mergers With Differentiated Products, 10
ANTITRUST 23 (1996).
15 Of course, if producers of A and B combined, it would also be
important to find out how buyers of B would respond if its price
increased. Perhaps the merged firm would have an incentive to raise B's
price too, and perhaps not.
16 See generally, Jonathan B. Baker, Contemporary Empirical
Merger Analysis, GEO. MASON U. L. REV. (forthcoming 1997).
17 Recent examples include the state of New York's unsuccessful
challenge to the cereal industry merger and the Antitrust Division's suc-
cessful challenge to some aspects of a recent bread baking merger. New
York v. Kraft General Foods, Inc., Nabisco Cereal, Inc., et al., Civil No.
93-0811 (KMW) (S.D.N.Y. February 22, 1995); U.S. v. Interstate Bak-
eries Corp. & Continental Baking Co., Civil Action No. 95C-4195 (N.D.
Ill., complaint filed July 20, 1995). See also LAWRENCE WHITE & JOHN
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place to start in assessing the competitive consequences of merg-
ers in industries characterized by extreme product differentiation.
Can legal doctrine follow economic analysis by moving beyond
the traditional reliance on market share proxies, to deal with the
issue of market power more directly? The answer has been
thought to depend on the statutory setting. The Clayton Act statu-
tory language requires demonstration of competitive effects in a
"line of commerce" and "section of the country." Even so, the
Clayton Act language does not demand the use of market-share
proxies for measuring competitive effects. A merger can also be
challenged under the Sherman Act, in which case the rule of
reason would apply, calling for balancing competitive harms and
benefits. But applying the rule of reason does not necessarily
entail definition of a market and proof of market shares, although
often that is what happens.
The possibility of observing and measuring market power
more directly suggests a new notion for Clayton Act doctrine: the
res ipsa loquitur market definition. When a piano crashes onto the
sidewalk, the law does not ask whether someone was negligent;
instead, it goes right to the question of who. This approach could
translate to antitrust. Suppose that a merger or other practice can
be shown, directly, to harm competition, for example by making
an increase in price likely. But suppose also that it is hard to draw
lines around a market, because the array of differentiated products
is broad and seamless. If competition will be harmed, some mar-
ket must exist within which competition takes place. Just exactly
where the market's boundaries are may not be very important,
though. Nor may it matter much whether the market in which the
harm occurs is large or small. All that should matter to the doc-
trine is that the "market" contain the products and locations that
circumscribe the consumer injury.
KwoKA, THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION 85 n14 (1989) (referencing an empir-
ical analysis of likely competitive effects in mergers among soft drink
producers). In these cases, high-quality data about consumer responses,
taken from supermarket scanners, made econometric analysis feasible.
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There is ample legal authority for dispensing with the market
definition exercise in rule-of-reason cases. If the harm is shown
directly, there is no point in requiring that it also be shown by
proxy.18 Proof of power to maintain price above competitive levels
or to harm competition by excluding efficient competitors-
appealing to the legal formulations that describe market or
monopoly power in Sherman Act cases-can establish the element
of monopoly power directly. It would certainly suffice in a non-
merger case brought under the Sherman Act or the Federal Trade
Commission Act. It ought to be possible to devise some formal
adaptation so these same principles would be available in merger
cases brought under section 7 of the Clayton Act-especially
given that the section 7, section 1 and section 5 analyses of merg-
ers are widely thought to have converged.19
Establishing the concept of a res ipsa loquitur market will
undoubtedly need to overcome some forensic hurdles.2 0 A likely
complaint will be that the res ipsa market comes perilously close
to the kind of ad hockery that gave "submarkets" a bad name. It
need not, if the idea is applied responsibly. After all, the point of
the res ipsa approach is really to bypass formal market definition.
What would end up identified as the focus of competition concern
might not, by conventional standards, be called "the market," but
18 FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460-61 (1986);
NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 109-10 (1984). See Richard
Schmalensee, Another Look at Market Power, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1789,
1807 (1982); cf. Franklin M. Fisher, Horizontal Mergers: Triage and
Treatment, 1 J. EcON. PERSPECTIvEs, Fall 1987, at 30 (the "real questions"
worthy of "serious analysis" involve competitive effects rather than mar-
ket definition); Thomas G. Krattenmaker et al., Monopoly Power and
Market Power in Antitrust Law, 76 GEORGETOWN L.J. 241 (1987) (sug-
gests ways that the approach to market definition should vary with the
competitive effect alleged).
19 PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 2 ANTITRUST LAW 1 304,
s 397f (rev. ed. 1995).
20 Until experience has clarified how to apply this analytic approach,
it would not be appropriate to employ it in criminal cases brought under
the Sherman Act. Criminal cases are exceedingly rare in merger enforce-
ment, however.
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would be given that label as a kind of legal fiction so we can get
on with the more important task of applying economic analysis to
identify competition problems.
The brewing industry example can help make the argument
more concrete. If the government could demonstrate directly-for
example based in part on the kind of econometric evidence previ-
ously cited-that the acquisition of Pabst by Anheuser-Busch
would give Anheuser-Busch the incentive and ability to raise the
price of its flagship brand, Budweiser, why should it still be nec-
essary for the government to prove whether light beer, foreign
imports, beer from microbreweries, nonalcoholic beer, wine, or
soft drinks are in the relevant market in order to prevail in a chal-
lenge? It is not satisfactory to answer that under such circum-
stances the relevant market, properly defined under the Merger
Guidelines, would include only Budweiser and Pabst Blue Rib-
bon, making this transaction challengeable as a merger to
monopoly. After all, it is difficult to imagine a judge, employing
the received approach of defining the market before reviewing the
competitive effects evidence and fearful of criticism for gerry-
mandering, defining a market that includes Budweiser but not
Miller.2 1
The legal problem, like the economic problem, is not one of
conception but of proof. Within a market, differentiation can lead
to localized competition problems that depend little on the precise
location of the market's boundaries. Those problems may be
demonstrated by quantitative economic evidence about the extent
of market power exercised, though the data needed for this kind of
analysis can be hard to come by and even if data are available,
quantitative evidence may not strongly reveal or rule out the
potential for competitive problems. Proof of particular, localized
effects may also rely on other evidence. This other evidence may
include the parties' admissions in their planning and marketing
21 Also, more technically, if the Budweiser price would not quite rise
5%, the Guidelines would require broadening the product market in any
case.
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documents that identify their principal competitors or claim credit
for their plans' anticipated exclusionary or price elevation effects.
It may also include the testimony of customers or rivals. This is
the same kind of evidence that is typically adduced in defining
relevant markets. That is no accident, for competitive effects anal-
ysis is concerned about identifying the products that constrain the
exercise of market power by the merging firms, just as the famil-
iar market definition exercise is also concerned. 22 In an industry
with extreme product differentiation, though, the output of the
standard market definition exercise can be unnecessary and dis-
tracting.
It is useful to anticipate and address some possible concerns
about the res ipsa approach to market definition in the kind of
markets where it would work best-those with few gaps in the
chain of substitutes, so that any market definition would appear
arbitrary. First, this approach does not turn the unilateral theory
of anticompetitive effects for differentiated products, set forth
in the 1992 Merger Guidelines, into a per se theory of liability.
On weighing the evidence, a court might discover that signifi-
cant competition is not internalized by the merger of the seller
of brand A and the seller of brand B-much as the econometric
evidence discussed above suggested that a Coors-Pabst merger
would not have harmed competition during the 1970s. More-
over, the merger will not have anticompetitive effects if it induces
timely, likely and sufficient repositioning of rivals' products or
entry. The brewing industry demonstrates that repositioning and
entry possibilities cannot be ignored, even when they would
require substantial sunk investments in brand reputation: Miller's
marketing investments in the early 1970s, repositioning its flag-
ship brand through the "Miller Time" advertising campaign and
introducing Miller Lite, appear to have competed away Bud-
22 For example, just as a narrow product market definition can be
challenged by showing that buyers might substitute to products outside
the market, a claim about buyer substitution patterns can be questioned
by showing the importance of considering a broader set of alternatives.
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weiser's previous market power.23 Also, efficiencies matter. For
example, if the merger lowers the marginal costs of producing and
selling brands A or B, prices could fall on net even if some local-
ized competition is removed.
Second, the enforcement agencies must engage in market defi-
nition, as the basis for computing market shares and Herfindahl-
Hirschman indexes (HHIs), in order to determine whether a
transaction falls into the Merger Guidelines' safe harbors. 24 It is
worth noting, however, that when evaluating mergers among sell-
ers of differentiated products, market share measures may not help
achieve two important purposes of a safe harbor.2 5 One purpose is
to remove from review transactions where the potential for the
exercise of market power is limited. Yet market shares are often
poor predictors of market power in settings where product differ-
entiation is extreme, and thus may not reliably serve that purpose.
Another purpose is to implement a presumption about effi-
ciencies, and here again market share measures may serve the pur-
pose poorly. High market shares for brands of differentiated
products may well be correlated with better products or lower
costs. But to the extent brand capital is less transferable to other
23 See Baker & Bresnahan, The Gains for Merger or Collusion in
Product-Differentiated Industries, supra note 13.
24 In addition to the familiar safe harbors involving the HHI, the uni-
lateral competitive effects sections of the 1992 Guidelines also make ref-
erence to safe harbors that apply when the merging firms in aggregate
account for less than 35% of the market. With respect to firms distin-
guished primarily by differentiated products, however, the language
employed in the Guidelines appears to apply the 35% safe harbor only
when market shares are employed as a benchmark for measuring likely
competitive effects (§ 2.2), and not when other data are used to make that
determination. Some agency officials have nevertheless described the
35% safe harbor as applying regardless of how the degree of competition
among products is estimated. See, e.g., interview with Assistant Attorney
General James Rill, 61 AN'rrRaUsT L.J. 229, 238 (1992); Paul Denis, Prac-
tical Approaches: An Insider's Look at the New Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, ANtusT, Summer 1992, at 9.
25 The problems noted below are less acute when products are rela-
tively homogeneous.
190 : The antitrust bulletin
uses than physical capital, combinations among sellers of branded
products may on average generate less scope for efficiencies than
would mergers among sellers of homogeneous goods. Until better
ways are developed to implement the reasonable presumption that
mergers generate some efficiencies in the differentiated products
case, however, the enforcement agencies can be expected to con-
tinue to rely upon the safe harbors built into the Merger Guide-
lines to inform their exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
In summary, antitrust's confusion about extremely differenti-
ated products in merger analysis comes because market definition
can be difficult and uninformative in such industries. That confu-
sion can be reduced by the use of economic tools to identify harm
directly, rather than relying on the proxy of market share. Doing
so will help courts balance better the unquestioned but hard-to-
measure value of variety and choice against what society is will-
ing to pay for that variety in localized market power.
III. Can investment in new products harm competition?
Buyers can benefit from the new products that result from
innovation, 26 an activity that can be thought of as product differ-
entiation over time. And while the results of research and devel-
opment may be unpredictable, firms can influence the types of
new products they produce and the probability of R&D success
through the extent and direction of their R&D and new product
marketing expenditures.
Seller investments in developing and marketing new products
benefit buyers by improving product quality, widening product
variety, and expanding buyer choice. But when it is an already
leading firm that engages in aggressive innovation, in a mar-
ket that is already highly concentrated, antitrust sensitivities can
be aroused. Does the R&D and marketing investment represent
26 Although this discussion focuses on new products, it is important
to recognize that innovation may also benefit buyers by allowing firms to
improve the quality of existing products or to lower their production
costs.
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competition "on the merits," the creation of new and better prod-
ucts that benefit consumers? Or does it merely amount to a strat-
egy of discomfiting and discouraging competitive threats from
fringe firm innovations, harming competition and consumers?
An illustration familiar to antitrust practitioners is presented
by the Berkey-Kodak litigation of the 1970s.27 That case explored
the obligations an innovating monopolist might have toward its
fringe firm competitors. Other antitrust cases that have wrestled
with leading firm innovation include the FTC's Xerox case in the
mid-1970s, 28 which ordered compulsory licensing of xerography
technology, and more recently the Justice Department's Microsoft
case, 29 which imposed some limits on the kinds of contracts
Microsoft can enter. The succession of technologies and products
in these industries-photography, xerography, and software-sug-
gests a now seemingly familiar pattern. The leading firm intro-
duces successive waves of new products or technological
systems. 30 These products may be improvements on previous ones
or replacements for them. They may be incompatible with the pre-
vious versions or with those of the fringe firms, thus making old
or competing products obsolete. Fringe firms may be reduced to
reacting to the leading firm's strategy.31
27 Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.
1979).
28 In re Xerox Corp., 86 F.T.C. 364 (1975). See Timothy F. Bresna-
han, Post-Entry Competition in the Plain-Paper Copier Market, 75 AM.
ECON. REv. 15 (Papers & Proceedings 1985).
29 U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 1995-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,096
(D.D.C. 1995) (consent decree).
30 For a discussion of how one leading firm manages its product
portfolio to keep successive waves of technology coming to market, see
MICHAEL A. CUSUMANO & RICHARD W. SELBY, MICROSOFT SECRETS (1995).
31 Yet leading firms need not be aggressive innovators. They may
instead accommodate fringe innovations and investment. That is what the
Big 3 automakers did in the 1960s and 1970s in response to product and
process innovations from Europe and Japan. Jonathan B. Baker, Fringe
Firms and Incentives to Innovate, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 621 (1995). The rea-
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Courts and enforcers must proceed with caution in applying
the antitrust laws in this area. On the one hand, leading firms
aggressively innovating can, in principle, harm competition.
Because ease of entry plays a critical role in preserving competi-
tion in many differentiated-product markets, it is appropriate to
worry that research and development investments could be an
instrument of strategic entry deterrence. On the other hand, it is
sensible to be wary of drawing that conclusion, because invest-
ments in innovation often have payoffs in better products, lower
costs, or higher quality. No one wants to kill the goose that may
be laying golden eggs-even if we fear the goose may be eating
its rivals' young.
Antitrust's fundamental task here is finding ways to challenge
those R&D and marketing strategies involving new products that
deter competition by rivals without producing benefits to buyers,
and it is a tough assignment.3 2 One reason it is difficult is that
firms will often not know how their R&D efforts will work out.
sons leading firms might accommodate rather than retaliate include fear
that new products might cannibalize their other product investments and
a belief that the fringe firm threat will be confined and will not spread.
See id. at 637-39. If leading firms are not aggressive, they are unlikely to
get into antitrust trouble for suppressing innovation. Of course, they may
still get into other kinds of antitrust trouble, for example, by fixing
prices.
32 The difficulty of doing so is often exacerbated when the invest-
ment in research and development does not merely lead to new products,
but also sets an industry standard. Then competition may involve rivalry
over the opportunity to create the next standard even more than rivalry
among the products within a standard. A standard-setter with intellectual
property protection might deter competition or control access to the
industry, thus inhibiting existing rivals employing the existing standard
as well as potential rivals with a potentially better one. On the other
hand, standards often also amplify the consumer benefits from innova-
tion, and intellectual property protection may be necessary to induce
firms to invest in developing and promoting potential standards. And if,
as often happens, adopting the standard facilitates the growth of network
externalities, the stakes are raised even higher, for the scope of the poten-
tial harm to competition and the range of the potential efficiency benefits
are likely both further increased.
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Thus, both the buyer benefits and the rival deterrent effects of
R&D must be assessed from an ex ante perspective, focusing on
what would be reasonable to expect at the time of innovation-a
question related to, but not identical with, asking whether the
R&D actually benefited buyers or harmed competitors. The likely
approach to this task was suggested by the Berkey panel, which
explained that Kodak's introduction of a new film format and
simultaneous withdrawal of an old format, forcing photographers
to buy photofinishing from Kodak rather than Berkey, could have
supplied the "bad act" necessary to support a charge of monopo-
lization-if the new format had not been better or cheaper than
the old.33
Despite the difficulty of the task, antitrust has, on the whole,
responsibly undertaken the assignment of distinguishing procom-
petitive innovation from monopolizing exclusion. Indeed, it
would be difficult to sustain the charge that antitrust routinely
penalizes success. For example, the government ultimately with-
drew its monopolization case against IBM, and virtually all of
Berkey's private monopolization verdict against Kodak was
reversed on appeal. 34 Similarly, the antitrust standards applied by
the courts tend to resolve unclear cases in favor of the innovative
leading firms. The courts have admittedly signaled a willingness
to target spurious new product investments-that is, research and
development or new product marketing expenditures by leading
firms-that appear purely, or even largely, aimed at restricting
competition by preempting rivals, without giving consumers much
33 Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 287 n.39. The court also concluded that
Berkey might have recovered for Kodak's refusal to package its new film
for camera formats other than the ones Kodak already made, if Berkey
had shown it suffered damages as a result. Id. at 290. The judgment on
that count was reversed because Berkey presented no evidence that it was
injured in this way. The court also held that the leading firm's conspiracy
with others to prevent disclosure of its innovation could be actionable,
but as a violation of section 1, not section 2, of the Sherman Act. Id. at
302.
34 Admittedly, reaching these results can cost time and money.
194 : The antitrust bulletin
benefit.35 This approach is consistent with the Berkey decision's
treatment of dominant firm innovation. 36 But courts hesitate to
find that new product R&D or marketing activities create antitrust
liability when defendants proffer a legitimate business justifica-
tion. In particular, courts are reluctant to find that a firm misused
its monopoly power through the introduction of any innovation
that lowers cost, improves quality or performance, or is otherwise
desirable to consumers, even if the innovation creates incompati-
bilities or otherwise raises costs to rivals.37 And while the essen-
tial facilities and monopoly leveraging doctrines could help
plaintiffs challenging leading firm practices, the courts may now
be limiting their application. 38
35 The possibility of nonprice predation through the development
and marketing of new products is well established in the economics liter-
ature. Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig, An Economic Definition of
Predatory Product Innovation, 91 YALE L.J. 8, 22-52 (1981); Joseph Far-
rell & Garth Saloner, Installed Base and Compatibility: Innovation,
Pre-Announcements and Predation, 76 AM. ECON. REv. 940 (1986);
Janusz A. Ordover & Garth Saloner, Predation, Monopolization, and
Antitrust, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 537, 563 (Richard
Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989); see generally Thomas Krat-
tenmaker & Steven Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals'
Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986).
36 See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263
(2d Cir. 1979); In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litig., 481
F. Supp. 965, 1002-03 (N.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd sub nom., Transamerica
Computer Co. v. IBM, 698 F.2d 1377, 1383 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 955 (1983); Litton Sys. v. AT&T, 700 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984).
37 Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.
1979); Northeastern Tel. Co. v. AT&T, 651 F.2d 76, 93 (2d Cir. 1981);
California Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM, 613 F.2d 727, 744 (9th Cir.
1979).
38 Compare Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need
of Limiting Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841 (1990) (emphasizing poten-
tial breadth) with William Kovacic, Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures
and Teaming Arrangements Involving Government Contractors, 58
ANTITRUST L.J. 1059, 1104 n.242 (1990) (recent narrowing). Compare
Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 276 (monopoly leveraging can be demon-
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These doctrinal developments will likely channel some future
litigation over the alleged exclusionary practices of innovative
leading firms into disputes about alternatives. As the late Profes-
sor Areeda put it, an anticompetitive restraint can be redeemed
only if it is reasonably necessary to a legitimate objective; and to
be reasonably necessary, the restraint must promote that objective
"significantly better than the available less restrictive alterna-
tives."39 Areeda goes on to ask, "Can that objective be achieved as
well without restraining competition so much?" 40 That question
could appear directly if the litigation arises under Sherman Act
section 1 and the rule of reason applies,41 or indirectly through the
determination of whether a monopolist has engaged in a "bad act"
sufficient to support a Sherman Act section 2 claim.
In sum, firm investments in the development and marketing
of new products-differentiation over time-can harm competi-
tion notwithstanding the fact that new products are introduced.
The more the investments appear aimed at creating aggressive
postentry competition rather than providing buyers with valuable
new consumption alternatives, the easier it is to conclude that
they are methods of weakening or removing the constraint on
pricing imposed by the threat of entry. But the stakes are high in
strated if a monopolist merely obtains a competitive advantage in a sec-
ond market, without attempting to monopolize it) with Alaska Airlines v.
U.S., 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991) (leveraging charge requires threatened
or actual monopoly in second market) and Fineman v. Armstrong World
Industries, 1992 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,010 (3d Cir. 1992) (same).
39 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, 7 ANTITRUST LAW 1505 (1986); cf. U.S.
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Guide-
lines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, § 4.2 (1995). "Less
restrictive alternative" analysis examines alternatives reasonably avail-
able at the time the restraint was imposed, thus comparing alternatives
from an ex ante perspective. ERNEST GELLHORN & WILLIAM E. KoVACIC,
ANTrrRUsT LAW & ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 259 (1994).
40 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, 7 ANTITRUST LAW 1505 (1986).
41 The alleged exclusionary practice could involve an agreement
between the leading firm and a supplier, for example, thus permitting a
section 1 charge.
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distinguishing such competitively malignant investments from
welfare-enhancing R&D and new product marketing expenditures,
because the costs of error can be large when dealing with innova-
tion.42 In consequence, we must proceed with caution and care in
applying the antitrust laws in this area, especially when the R&D
or new product marketing investments at issue produce demon-
strable benefits to consumers.
IV. Concluding comment
Product differentiation-over space and across time-presents
special challenges for antitrust law. Cases in differentiated-prod-
uct industries often involve difficult analytic tasks, novel fact pat-
terns, and high stakes. Yet, through the application of economic
analysis, antitrust is increasingly able to discriminate between
anticompetitive and procompetitive conduct in these settings.
42 Challenges to new product development and marketing efforts as
instruments of entry deterrence will likely be the most difficult in an
oligopoly setting, where none of the leading firms is a section 2 monopo-
list and the firms may adopt entry- and innovation-deterring practices
without entering into a demonstrable Sherman Act section 1 agreement.
This situation seems appropriate for the application of section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, either through enforcement actions or
some form of competition rulemaking, to clarify what kinds of strategic
"investments" in deterring competition are to be discouraged. Cf.
Jonathan Baker, Two Sherman Act Section I Dilemmas: Parallel Pricing,
the Oligopoly Problem, and Contemporary Economic Theory, 38
ANTITRUST BULL. 143, 207-19 (1993).
